Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting

DOI10.3982/TE1425zbMath1395.91048MaRDI QIDQ4586016

Takuo Sugaya

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect monitoringunequal discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Fairly taking turns ⋮ Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games ⋮ Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly

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