Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

DOI10.3982/TE1362zbMath1395.91037MaRDI QIDQ4586018

Yuichiro Kamada, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgerationalizabilityself-confirming equilibriumextensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (9)

Payoff information and learning in signaling games ⋮ Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games ⋮ Rational play in extensive-form games ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium ⋮ Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness

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