Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
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Publication:4586048
DOI10.3982/TE1839zbMath1395.91346MaRDI QIDQ4586048
Tayfun Sönmez, Scott Duke Kominers
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
stabilitymarket designstrategy-proofnessmatching with contractsairline seat upgradesschool choice, affirmative action
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