Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints

DOI10.3982/TE1731zbMath1395.91334OpenAlexW2267973903MaRDI QIDQ4586050

Azar Abizada

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1731

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessbudget constraintpairwise stabilityPareto-undominated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ Graduate admission with financial support ⋮ A college admissions clearinghouse ⋮ College admissions with tuition transfers

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