Many-to-many matching and price discrimination

DOI10.3982/TE1904zbMath1395.91343OpenAlexW2124915065MaRDI QIDQ4586061

Renato Gomes, Alessandro Pavan

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1904

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmechanism designmany-to-many matchingcross-subsidizationvertical matching markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Matching in closed-form: equilibrium, identification, and comparative statics ⋮ On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform ⋮ Tailored recommendations on a matching platform ⋮ Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions ⋮ Synchronized matching with incomplete information ⋮ Monopolistic Signal Provision

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