On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions

DOI10.3982/TE1198zbMath1395.91228OpenAlexW2555098184MaRDI QIDQ4586066

Jacob K. Goeree, Yuanchuan Lien

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1198

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumcomplementssubstitutesVickrey auctionBayesian implementabilitycore outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information ⋮ The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism ⋮ The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions ⋮ Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification ⋮ Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions ⋮ A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices ⋮ On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions ⋮ Core deviation minimizing auctions ⋮ Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

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