Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget

DOI10.3982/TE1745zbMath1395.91217OpenAlexW2287029114MaRDI QIDQ4586069

Justin Burkett

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1745

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Money burning in the theory of delegation ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers ⋮ Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets ⋮ Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions

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