Deprecated: $wgMWOAuthSharedUserIDs=false is deprecated, set $wgMWOAuthSharedUserIDs=true, $wgMWOAuthSharedUserSource='local' instead [Called from MediaWiki\HookContainer\HookContainer::run in /var/www/html/w/includes/HookContainer/HookContainer.php at line 135] in /var/www/html/w/includes/Debug/MWDebug.php on line 372
Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit - MaRDI portal

Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4586074

DOI10.3982/TE1905zbMath1395.91055MaRDI QIDQ4586074

Mathias Staudigl, William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)




Related Items (23)

On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network gamesStochastic control of a class of dynamical systems via path limitsEvolutionary game theory: a renaissanceHamilton-Jacobi Equations with Semilinear Costs and State Constraints, with Applications to Large Deviations in GamesStatistical inference in evolutionary dynamicsLearning and equilibrium transitions: stochastic stability in discounted stochastic fictitious playTransitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choiceExit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choiceUnnamed ItemPayoff-dependent dynamics and coordination gamesPositive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice ruleMetastability of logit dynamics for coordination gamesProspect dynamics and loss dominanceAn introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamicsMetastability in stochastic replicator dynamicsReference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stabilityA stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form gamesSample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game DynamicsTransitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choiceLong-run analysis of the stochastic replicator dynamics in the presence of random jumpsTributes to Bill SandholmStochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination gamesLarge deviations and stochastic stability in population games




This page was built for publication: Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit