Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents

DOI10.3982/TE833zbMath1395.91043OpenAlexW1570017940MaRDI QIDQ4586079

Madhav Chandrasekher

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te833

zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamesstatistical testingcollusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets

Cites Work

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