Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
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Publication:4586079
DOI10.3982/TE833zbMath1395.91043OpenAlexW1570017940MaRDI QIDQ4586079
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te833
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Cites Work
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