Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
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Publication:4586081
DOI10.3982/TE1559zbMath1395.91079OpenAlexW1510894957MaRDI QIDQ4586081
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1559
Games involving graphs (91A43) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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