A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
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Publication:4586083
DOI10.3982/TE1512zbMath1395.91034OpenAlexW1545037858MaRDI QIDQ4586083
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1512
Related Items (5)
On the Strategic Equivalence of Linear Dynamic and Repeated Games ⋮ Stochastic Games ⋮ Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
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