Specialization and partisanship in committee search
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4586091
DOI10.3982/TE1292zbMath1395.91124MaRDI QIDQ4586091
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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