Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria

DOI10.3982/TE1156zbMath1395.91059MaRDI QIDQ4586096

Alessandro Pavan, George-Marios Angeletos

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaglobal gamesendogenous informationrobust predictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

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