An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring

DOI10.3982/TE1302zbMath1395.91039OpenAlexW1551002320MaRDI QIDQ4586097

Dilip Abreu, Yuliy Sannikov

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1302

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescomputationperfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers ⋮ Critical discount factor values in discounted supergames ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Empirical framework for two-player repeated games with random states ⋮ On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games ⋮ Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames

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