Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules

DOI10.3982/TE1111zbMath1395.91154OpenAlexW1871772455MaRDI QIDQ4586099

Doug Smith, Tilman Börgers

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1111

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremrobust mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ Robust dynamic implementation ⋮ Invariance to representation of information ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation ⋮ (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) ⋮ What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?

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