Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies

DOI10.3982/TE1214zbMath1395.91308MaRDI QIDQ4586100

Arunava Sen, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Manipushpak Mitra

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencydictatorshipstrategy proofnessexchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (13)

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Non-dictatorial public distribution rules ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies ⋮ Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects ⋮ Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies ⋮ A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

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