Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

DOI10.3982/TE1202zbMath1395.91060OpenAlexW1500587159MaRDI QIDQ4586102

Riccardo Calcagno, Takuo Sugaya, Stefano Lovo, Yuichiro Kamada

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1202

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionfinite horizonrevision gamesasynchronous movespre-opening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (9)

Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination ⋮ Cooperative Decision Making in Cooperative Control Systems by Means of Game Theory ⋮ Zero-sum revision games ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Characterizing agent behavior in revision games with uncertain deadline ⋮ Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies ⋮ The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?

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