Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

DOI10.3982/TE1318zbMath1395.91211OpenAlexW2166204006MaRDI QIDQ4586104

Daniel J. Seidmann, Vincent Anesi

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1318

zbMATH Keywords

stable setbargainingcommittee votingevolving default

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures

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