Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

DOI10.3982/TE821zbMath1395.91065MaRDI QIDQ4586105

No author found.

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

private informationcheap talklegislative bargainingbundlingrhetoric

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining ⋮ Sequential vote buying

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