Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values

DOI10.3982/TE787zbMath1395.91068MaRDI QIDQ4586109

Thomas Tröger, Tymofiy Mylovanov

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformed principalprivate valuesstrong unconstrained Pareto optimum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (10)

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types ⋮ Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ Verifiable disclosure ⋮ Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information ⋮ Selling with evidence

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