Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
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Publication:4586109
DOI10.3982/TE787zbMath1395.91068MaRDI QIDQ4586109
Thomas Tröger, Tymofiy Mylovanov
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (10)
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types ⋮ Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ Verifiable disclosure ⋮ Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information ⋮ Selling with evidence
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