The ex ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty
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Publication:4586111
DOI10.3982/TE896zbMath1395.91147MaRDI QIDQ4586111
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Fair management of social risk, Zhou's aggregation theorems with multiple welfare weights, Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information, Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts, Aggregation of opinions and risk measures, Separate aggregation of beliefs and values under ambiguity
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