Optimal insurance with adverse selection

DOI10.3982/TE671zbMath1395.91248MaRDI QIDQ4586112

Hector Chade, Edward E. Schlee

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelcommon valueswealth effectsquantity discountsempirical tests for adverse selectionmonopoly insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (9)

REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Insurance contracts and financial markets ⋮ Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling ⋮ Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection ⋮ OPTIMAL REINSURANCE DESIGN WITH DISTORTION RISK MEASURES AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ⋮ The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making ⋮ On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition ⋮ Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection ⋮ Reinsurance contract design with adverse selection

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