Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

DOI10.3982/TE909zbMath1395.91159OpenAlexW2103764625MaRDI QIDQ4586114

Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Alexander Reffgen

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te909

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessadditive preferencesseparable preferencesmultiple public goodsvoting under constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (9)

Strategy-proof partitioning ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains ⋮ On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness ⋮ Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof location of public facilities ⋮ Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle

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