Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

DOI10.3982/TE652zbMath1395.91050MaRDI QIDQ4586120

Josef Hofbauer, Christoph Kuzmics, Dieter Balkenborg

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

learningasymptotic stabilityevolutionary game theorybest response dynamicsNash equilibrium refinementsCURB setspersistent retracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (12)

Nash blocks ⋮ Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Affine Relaxations of the Best Response Algorithm: Global Convergence in Ratio-Bounded Games ⋮ Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling ⋮ Higher order game dynamics ⋮ A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory ⋮ Best-response dynamics in zero-sum stochastic games ⋮ Tempered best response dynamics ⋮ The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games ⋮ Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games ⋮ Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm

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