Designing Cyber Insurance Policies: Mitigating Moral Hazard Through Security Pre-Screening

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_6zbMath1375.91105OpenAlexW2755503278MaRDI QIDQ4588255

Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili

Publication date: 1 November 2017

Published in: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (3)

Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities ⋮ Modeling and pricing cyber insurance. Idiosyncratic, systematic, and systemic risks ⋮ An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents

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