Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model
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Publication:4588487
DOI10.1515/bejte-2015-0045zbMath1375.91159OpenAlexW2290874200MaRDI QIDQ4588487
Toshihiro Matsumura, Hiroaki Ino
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-1/bejte-2015-0045/bejte-2015-0045.xml?format=INT
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Welfare economics (91B15)
Related Items (5)
Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks ⋮ Analysis of game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market under constrains on the capacity and competitiveness of agents ⋮ Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions ⋮ Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market ⋮ Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents
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