When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.03.001zbMath1308.91118OpenAlexW2041078214MaRDI QIDQ459157

Yajing Chen

Publication date: 8 October 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.03.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand ⋮ On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms

Cites Work

• Group robust stability in matching markets
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities

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