On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500128zbMath1415.91026OpenAlexW1948283086MaRDI QIDQ4593820

Pierre Dehez

Publication date: 15 November 2017

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500128

zbMATH Keywords

coreWeber setweighted Shapley valuesHarsanyi dividends

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Harsanyi support levels solutions ⋮ Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games ⋮ Shapley value of homogeneous cooperative games ⋮ On the core and Shapley value for regular polynomial games

Cites Work

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