A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
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Publication:459421
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.001zbMath1296.91010OpenAlexW2093882041MaRDI QIDQ459421
Maria Romaniello, Giuseppe De Marco
Publication date: 8 October 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.001
Related Items (5)
On games and equilibria with coherent lower expectations ⋮ Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences ⋮ Ambiguous games without a state space and full rationality ⋮ Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games ⋮ Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
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