Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game

DOI10.1017/S0956792515000649zbMath1408.91031OpenAlexW2128234973MaRDI QIDQ4594583

Ryan Kendall, Martin B. Short, Michael McBride, Maria R. D'Orsogna

Publication date: 24 November 2017

Published in: European Journal of Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0956792515000649

zbMATH Keywords

best response dynamicssocial modelingcooperative behavioradversarial game theorymathematical criminology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (2)

Bribery games on interdependent complex networks ⋮ The effects of sacred value networks within an evolutionary, adversarial game

Cites Work

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• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• The evolution of cooperation through imitation
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• External conversions of player strategy in an evolutionary game: A cost-benefit analysis through optimal control

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