Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy

DOI10.1613/jair.5515;zbMath1426.91092arXiv1411.7812MaRDI QIDQ4600728

Jiehua Chen, Nimrod Talmon, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier

Publication date: 12 January 2018

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.7812

zbMATH Keywords

electionscomputational complexityvoting rulescandidate control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Related Items (10)

Tennis manipulation: can we help Serena Williams win another tournament? Or can we control a knockout tournament with reasonable complexity? ⋮ The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters ⋮ Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard ⋮ The complexity of priced control in elections ⋮ On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections ⋮ Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections ⋮ A parameterized perspective on protecting elections ⋮ Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery ⋮ \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters ⋮ Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers

This page was built for publication: Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy