Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500207zbMath1391.91015OpenAlexW2740040765MaRDI QIDQ4602184

Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon, Theo S. H. Driessen

Publication date: 9 January 2018

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500207

zbMATH Keywords

coreTU-gameStackelberg oligopolyset of imputations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (2)

Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products ⋮ A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities

Cites Work

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• On the core of dynamic cooperative games
• The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
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• A necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity in oligopoly games
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies.
• Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• Convexity of oligopoly games without transferable technologies
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations

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