Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action

DOI10.1007/978-3-0348-0122-5_7zbMath1379.92075OpenAlexW73291559WikidataQ61908005 ScholiaQ61908005MaRDI QIDQ4602966

Jorge M. Pacheco, Max O. Souza, Francisco C. Santos, Brian Skyrms

Publication date: 7 February 2018

Published in: The Mathematics of Darwin’s Legacy (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-0122-5_7

zbMATH Keywords

population dynamicsevolution of cooperationthreshold gamescollective coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (1)

Automatic verification of concurrent stochastic systems

Cites Work

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• Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
• Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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