Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities

DOI10.1287/opre.2016.1585zbMath1387.90046OpenAlexW2606033647MaRDI QIDQ4604896

Alexandre Belloni, Saša Pekeč, Changrong Deng

Publication date: 6 March 2018

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/431dc60dbc67e39eac5ae1e89ceeaf456d93fe29

zbMATH Keywords

network designmechanism designnegative externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Procurement with Cost and Noncost Attributes: Cost-Sharing Mechanisms ⋮ Diffusion auction design ⋮ Diffusion in Random Networks: Impact of Degree Distribution ⋮ Impact of Network Structure on New Service Pricing

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Strategy-proof location on a network
• Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Dynamics in tree formation games
• The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations
• Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
• Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Instability of Centralized Markets
• Distributed Welfare Games
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

This page was built for publication: Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities