Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006zbMath1408.91091OpenAlexW1965124098MaRDI QIDQ460636

Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo

Publication date: 13 October 2014

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designpayment redistributionVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (13)

Efficient Money Burning in General Domains ⋮ Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Efficiency and Budget Balance ⋮ Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects ⋮ Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains ⋮ Efficient money burning in general domains ⋮ Optimal allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms ⋮ Destroy to save ⋮ An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method ⋮ Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects

Cites Work

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• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Undominated Groves Mechanisms
• Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems
• Derandomization of auctions
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions

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