scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6850443

zbMath1403.91161arXiv1703.08607MaRDI QIDQ4608027

Kira Goldner, J. Benjamin Miller, Shuchi Chawla, Emmanouil Pountourakis

Publication date: 15 March 2018

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.08607

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevenue maximizationuncertainty-averse buyer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents

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