scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6850471

zbMath1403.91171arXiv1707.05875MaRDI QIDQ4608057

Hu Fu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Christopher Liaw, Pinyan Lu

Publication date: 15 March 2018

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.05875

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

zbMATH Keywords

information concealmentmulti-bidder single-item auctionsrevenue optimizing seller

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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