scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6850472

zbMath1403.91158arXiv1708.00611MaRDI QIDQ4608058

Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Hai-Feng Xu

Publication date: 15 March 2018

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.00611

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zbMATH Keywords

optimal revealing of informationoptimal signaling schemesecond-price ad auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Marketing, advertising (90B60) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

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Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive ⋮ Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling ⋮ Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

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