How Pseudo-hypotheses Defeat a Non-Bayesian Theory of Evidence: Reply to Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan

DOI10.1080/02698595.2017.1316111zbMath1384.03082OpenAlexW2747214485MaRDI QIDQ4608226

Colin Howson

Publication date: 16 March 2018

Published in: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84235/1/Howson_Pseudo-hypotheses%20defeat%20reply_2017.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• Repelling a Prussian charge with a solution to a paradox of Dubins
• Statistical Evidence
• Non-Bayesian Accounts of Evidence: Howson’s Counterexample Countered
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