Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values
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Publication:4608751
DOI10.1142/S0219198917500293zbMath1398.91040OpenAlexW2774574603MaRDI QIDQ4608751
Publication date: 28 March 2018
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500293
Related Items (8)
Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions ⋮ Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values ⋮ Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values ⋮ Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
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