When to Drop a Bombshell

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDX070zbMath1405.91064OpenAlexW2528605029MaRDI QIDQ4610465

Gabriele Gratton, Anton Kolotilin, Richard T. Holden

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx070

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learninginformation disclosurestrategic timingcredibility versus scrutiny

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication ⋮ Public information: relevance or salience? ⋮ Editorial. Introduction to the special issue political games: strategy, persuasion, and learning ⋮ Electoral competition with strategic disclosure ⋮ Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade? ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision

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