Trading Dynamics with Private Buyer Signals in the Market for Lemons

DOI10.1093/restud/rdy007zbMath1405.91388OpenAlexW2551629613MaRDI QIDQ4610480

Ayça Kaya, Kyung Min Kim

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/943e5774a6df9a9e705613db44d5b5dd57709ca8

zbMATH Keywords

inspectionadverse selectionmarket for lemonstime-on-the-market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (12)

A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations ⋮ Market-making with search and information frictions ⋮ Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning ⋮ Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection ⋮ Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Seller experimentation and trade ⋮ Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions ⋮ A theory of bargaining deadlock ⋮ Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets ⋮ Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection ⋮ Quality, price, and time-on-market ⋮ Market screening with limited records

This page was built for publication: Trading Dynamics with Private Buyer Signals in the Market for Lemons