Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

DOI10.1093/restud/rdr026zbMath1405.91310OpenAlexW1581513562MaRDI QIDQ4610501

Motty Perry, Alex Gershkov

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/42310/1/WRAP_Perry_150312-12-01-2011-dynamic-contract-final1.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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