Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
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Publication:4610505
DOI10.1093/restud/rdr018zbMath1405.91070OpenAlexW2110591040MaRDI QIDQ4610505
Chris C. Wallace, David P. Myatt
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c5f1f69d88c976ef5a3e154885dede71b9339abc
Related Items (28)
Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications ⋮ Rational inattention and public signals ⋮ Multi-layered rational inattention and time-varying volatility ⋮ The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Information rigidities and asymmetric business cycles ⋮ Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition and use by networked players ⋮ Information acquisition in global games of regime change ⋮ The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group ⋮ Unrestricted information acquisition ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Cournot competition and the social value of information ⋮ Characterizing social value of information ⋮ Coordination with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Information quality and crises in regime-change games ⋮ Financial prices and information acquisition in large Cournot markets ⋮ Information acquisition and welfare in network games ⋮ Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: a beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination ⋮ The social value of information and the competition motive: price versus quantity games ⋮ Learning over the business cycle: policy implications ⋮ Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games ⋮ Regime change in large information networks ⋮ Searching for information ⋮ Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure ⋮ Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets ⋮ Learning in crowded markets ⋮ The social value of public information with convex costs of information acquisition
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