Robust Collusion with Private Information

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDR035zbMath1405.91030OpenAlexW2071080659MaRDI QIDQ4610526

David A. Miller

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr035

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesmechanism designprivate informationcollusionprice wars\textit{ex post} incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Optimal allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Taking turns ⋮ Multi-product supply networks: implications of intermediaries ⋮ Dynamic coordination via organizational routines

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