Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment
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Publication:4610527
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDR038zbMath1405.91461OpenAlexW3125580958MaRDI QIDQ4610527
Mark L. J. Wright, Rohan Pitchford
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16632.pdf
Related Items (3)
Income inequality and sovereign default ⋮ Settlement games with rank-order payoffs and applications to sovereign debt restructuring ⋮ Preemption with a second-mover advantage
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