Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDR048zbMath1405.91188OpenAlexW2112648557MaRDI QIDQ4610541

Richard Romano, Stephen M. Calabrese, Dennis Epple

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr048

zbMATH Keywords

local public goodsresidential externalitytiebout competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Public goods (91B18) Welfare economics (91B15)

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