Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
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Publication:4610569
DOI10.1093/restud/rds025zbMath1405.91271OpenAlexW1976843771MaRDI QIDQ4610569
Ian Gale, Jinwoo Kim, Yeon-Koo Che
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/29aeb4d4b2ca7227bd4a9c618e10c4d6430a4f29
Related Items (8)
Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets ⋮ Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources ⋮ Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers ⋮ Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
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