Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses

DOI10.1093/restud/rds026zbMath1405.91157OpenAlexW2151382108MaRDI QIDQ4610577

Joseph McMurray

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds026

zbMATH Keywords

electionsinformationvotingturnoutjury theoremswing voter's curseroll-off

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (16)

The importance of expertise in group decisions ⋮ The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ IMPORTANCE IN SYSTEMS WITH INTERVAL DECISIONS ⋮ Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? ⋮ Abstention, ideology and information acquisition ⋮ Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium ⋮ Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse ⋮ Voluntary voting: costs and benefits ⋮ Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting ⋮ Voting on tricky questions ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers

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