Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games--an Unrefinable Folk Theorem

DOI10.1093/restud/rds027zbMath1405.91032OpenAlexW2114635320MaRDI QIDQ4610581

Muhamet Yildiz, Jonathan Weinstein

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82897

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessdynamic gamesfolk theoremhigher-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games ⋮ Robust dynamic implementation ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

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